POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF LOSS AVERSION

被引:120
作者
JERVIS, R [1 ]
机构
[1] COLUMBIA UNIV,INST WAR & PEACE STUDIES,NEW YORK,NY 10027
关键词
PROSPECT THEORY; RISK; CRISIS STABILITY; SOCIAL STABILITY; CONFLICT;
D O I
10.2307/3791678
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
Prospect theory offers powerful insights and propositions into political decision-making, especially in international politics. Evidence indicates that statesmen are indeed risk-acceptant for losses. This would help explain observed patterns in bargaining, deterrence, the origins of wars, as well as suggesting why states are less likely to behave aggressively when doing so would produce gains than when such behavior might prevent losses.
引用
收藏
页码:187 / 204
页数:18
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