IN DEFENSE OF A COLLECTIVE GOODS THEORY OF ALLIANCES

被引：15

作者：

SANDLER, T

CAULEY, J

FORBES, JF

机构：

[1] UNIV YORK,INST SOCIAL & ECON RES,YORK YO1 5DD,N YORKSHIRE,ENGLAND

[2] UNIV HAWAII,DEPT ECON,HILO,HI 96720

[3] UNIV GLASGOW,SOCIAL PAEDIAT & OBSTET RES UNIT,GLASGOW G12 8QQ,SCOTLAND

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.1177/002200278002400308

中图分类号：

D81 [国际关系];

学科分类号：

030207 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：537 / 547

页数：11

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