THE ROLE OF MARKET FORCES IN ASSURING CONTRACTUAL PERFORMANCE

[1] MARKET FOR LEMONS - QUALITY UNCERTAINTY AND MARKET MECHANISM [J]. QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1970, 84 (03) : 488 - 500

[2] [Anonymous], 1937, INQUIRY NATURE CAUSE

[3] LAW ENFORCEMENT, MALFEASANCE, AND COMPENSATION OF ENFORCERS [J]. JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES, 1974, 3 (01) : 1 - 18

[4] Chamberlin EH, 1965, THEORY MONOPOLISTIC

[5] FREE COMPETITION AND OPTIMAL AMOUNT OF FRAUD [J]. JOURNAL OF LAW & ECONOMICS, 1973, 16 (01) : 67 - 88

[6] THE NATURE OF EQUILIBRIUM IN MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1959, 67 (01) : 21 - 30

[7] DO COMPETITION AND MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION DIFFER [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1968, 76 (01) : 146 - 148

[8] TOWARD AN EXPANDED ECONOMIC-THEORY OF CONTRACT [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ISSUES, 1976, 10 (01) : 45 - 61

[9] Hayek F. A., 1948, INDIVIDUALISM EC ORD

[10] HOBBES T, 1955, LEVIATHAN

[1] MARKET FOR LEMONS - QUALITY UNCERTAINTY AND MARKET MECHANISM [J]. QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1970, 84 (03) : 488 - 500

[2] [Anonymous], 1937, INQUIRY NATURE CAUSE

[3] LAW ENFORCEMENT, MALFEASANCE, AND COMPENSATION OF ENFORCERS [J]. JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES, 1974, 3 (01) : 1 - 18

[4] Chamberlin EH, 1965, THEORY MONOPOLISTIC

[5] FREE COMPETITION AND OPTIMAL AMOUNT OF FRAUD [J]. JOURNAL OF LAW & ECONOMICS, 1973, 16 (01) : 67 - 88

[6] THE NATURE OF EQUILIBRIUM IN MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1959, 67 (01) : 21 - 30

[7] DO COMPETITION AND MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION DIFFER [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1968, 76 (01) : 146 - 148

[8] TOWARD AN EXPANDED ECONOMIC-THEORY OF CONTRACT [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ISSUES, 1976, 10 (01) : 45 - 61

[9] Hayek F. A., 1948, INDIVIDUALISM EC ORD

[10] HOBBES T, 1955, LEVIATHAN