PROBABILISTIC VOTING POWER IN THE EU COUNCIL - THE CASES OF TRADE-POLICY AND SOCIAL REGULATION

被引:23
作者
WIDGREN, M [1 ]
机构
[1] CEPR,LONDON,ENGLAND
关键词
D O I
10.2307/3440533
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The distribution of voting power in the EU Council of Ministers is studied in regard to trade policy and social regulation. Member states are divided into three groups according to their attitudes toward the policy issues under consideration. The objectives are to evaluate member countries' voting power as compared to situations where predetermined coalitions do not exist, analyze the kinds of decisions the Council can and probably will make concerning these policy issues, and examine whether an expansion of the EU by the EFTA countries will change the direction of policymaking.
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页码:345 / 356
页数:12
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