AN AGENT MORALITY VIEW OF BUSINESS POLICY

被引:179
作者
QUINN, DP
JONES, TM
机构
[1] GEORGETOWN UNIV, SCH BUSINESS, WASHINGTON, DC USA
[2] UNIV WASHINGTON, SEATTLE, WA 98195 USA
关键词
D O I
10.2307/258885
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We develop a philosophical perspective on the moral obligations of managers, which we call agent morality, by examining the moral implications of agency theory. Our view is grounded in noninstrumental ethics, which we argue is logically superior to instrumental ethics. We show that the principal-agent model of the firm, once properly considered, requires that managers fashion business policies with reference first to certain moral duties and second to shareholder wealth.
引用
收藏
页码:22 / 42
页数:21
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