AGENCY IN HEALTH-CARE WITH AN ENDOGENOUS BUDGET CONSTRAINT

被引：5

作者：

CLARK, D

OLSEN, JA

机构：

[1] Department of Economics, NFH, University of Tromsø, 9037 Tromsø

来源：

JOURNAL OF HEALTH ECONOMICS | 1994年 / 13卷 / 02期

关键词：

PERFECT AGENCY; SPLIT PREFERENCES; ENDOGENOUS BUDGET;

D O I：

10.1016/0167-6296(94)90025-6

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In this paper a doctor acts as a perfect agent for a group of patients in an environment where the health service is funded by a group of contributors. The contributor group donates resources to the health sector in accordance with its split preferences about the health care services which they would like for themselves and those which they would like for others. We show that the size of the health budget is endogenous and depends on the choices made by the doctor. The focus is on the division of the budget between health enhancing and non-health enhancing health care.

引用

页码：231 / 251

页数：21

共 15 条

[1] PRIVATELY PROVIDED PUBLIC-GOODS IN A LARGE ECONOMY - THE LIMITS OF ALTRUISM [J].