A NOTE ON EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE STRATEGIES IN ASYMMETRIC ANIMAL CONFLICTS

被引:479
作者
SELTEN, R
机构
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D O I
10.1016/S0022-5193(80)81038-1
中图分类号
Q [生物科学];
学科分类号
07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;
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页码:93 / 101
页数:9
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