OPEN-LOOP AND FEEDBACK MODELS OF DYNAMIC OLIGOPOLY

被引：11

作者：

KARP, LS ^{[1
]}

PERLOFF, JM ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV CALIF BERKELEY,DEPT AGR & RESOURCE ECON,BERKELEY,CA 94720

来源：

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION | 1993年 / 11卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0167-7187(93)90015-5

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

A simple method of estimating the degree of oligopoly power in dynamic markets using either open-loop or feedback (subgame perfect) strategies is developed. New theoretical results are presented for families of oligopoly models. Differences between discrete-time and continuous-time models and open-loop and feedback models are demonstrated. The effects of increasing the number of firms or adjustment costs are examined.

引用

页码：369 / 389

页数：21

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