SMOKING, SKYDIVING, AND KNITTING - THE ENDOGENOUS CATEGORIZATION OF RISKS IN INSURANCE MARKETS WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION

被引:44
作者
BOND, EW
CROCKER, KJ
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D O I
10.1086/261745
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
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页码:177 / 200
页数:24
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