THE PRESENCE OF MORAL HAZARD IN BUDGET BREAKING

被引：6

作者：

GAYNOR, M

机构：

[1] NATL BUR ECON RES, CAMBRIDGE, MA 02138 USA

[2] UNIV TEXAS, ARLINGTON, TX 76019 USA

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.1007/BF00123888

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：261 / 267

页数：7

共 11 条

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