BUYING FRENZIES AND SELLER-INDUCED EXCESS-DEMAND

被引:99
作者
DEGRABA, P
机构
关键词
D O I
10.2307/2555920
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
I explain why a monopolist would knowingly create excess demand. Suppose customers initially do not know their valuation for a good but over time become informed. Although customers prefer purchasing after becoming informed, a monopolist prefers selling to customers while uninformed, because a group of uninformed customers has a more homogeneous (expected) valuation for the good than do informed customers. Selling fewer units than the number of customers induces customers to purchase while uninformed, because anyone waiting to purchase until becoming informed finds no units available. This ''buying frenzy'' behavior allows the monopolist to set price above the ''informed'' market-clearing price.
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页码:331 / 342
页数:12
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