ON THE STRATEGIC STABILITY OF EQUILIBRIA

被引：752

作者：

KOHLBERG, E

MERTENS, JF

机构：

[1] CATHOLIC UNIV LOUVAIN,B-1348 LOUVAIN LA NEUVE,BELGIUM

[2] CTR OPER RES & ECON,LOUVAIN LA NEUVE,BELGIUM

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/1912320

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：1003 / 1037

页数：35

共 19 条

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