HOW TARGET SHAREHOLDERS BENEFIT FROM VALUE-REDUCING DEFENSIVE STRATEGIES IN TAKEOVERS

被引:34
作者
BERKOVITCH, E
KHANNA, N
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D O I
10.2307/2328813
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
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页码:137 / 156
页数:20
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