SIGNALING GAMES AND STABLE EQUILIBRIA

[1] ADMATI A, IN PRESS REV EC STUD

[2] [Anonymous], 1978, INT J GAME THEORY

[3] CORRELATED EQUILIBRIUM AS AN EXPRESSION OF BAYESIAN RATIONALITY [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1987, 55 (01) : 1 - 18

[4] BANKS JS, IN PRESS ECONOMETRIC

[5] CHO I, 1986, THESIS PRINCETON U

[6] CHO IK, IN PRESS ECONOMETRIC

[7] STRATEGIC INFORMATION-TRANSMISSION [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1982, 50 (06) : 1431 - 1451

[8] DEMSKI J, 1986, DELEGATED EXPERTISE

[9] FARRELL J, 1985, CREDIBLE NEOLOGISMS

[10] GROSSMAN S, 1981, J LAW ECON, P461

[1] ADMATI A, IN PRESS REV EC STUD

[2] [Anonymous], 1978, INT J GAME THEORY

[3] CORRELATED EQUILIBRIUM AS AN EXPRESSION OF BAYESIAN RATIONALITY [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1987, 55 (01) : 1 - 18

[4] BANKS JS, IN PRESS ECONOMETRIC

[5] CHO I, 1986, THESIS PRINCETON U

[6] CHO IK, IN PRESS ECONOMETRIC

[7] STRATEGIC INFORMATION-TRANSMISSION [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1982, 50 (06) : 1431 - 1451

[8] DEMSKI J, 1986, DELEGATED EXPERTISE

[9] FARRELL J, 1985, CREDIBLE NEOLOGISMS

[10] GROSSMAN S, 1981, J LAW ECON, P461