STRATEGIC INFORMATION-TRANSMISSION

被引：2036

作者：

CRAWFORD, VP

SOBEL, J

机构：

来源：

ECONOMETRICA | 1982年 / 50卷 / 06期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/1913390

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 [经济学];

摘要：

引用

收藏

页码：1431 / 1451

页数：21

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