PREDATION, REPUTATION, AND ENTRY DETERRENCE

被引：816

作者：

MILGROM, P ^{[1
]}

ROBERTS, J ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] STANFORD UNIV, GRAD SCH BUSINESS, STANFORD, CA 94305 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 1982年 / 27卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0022-0531(82)90031-X

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

收藏

页码：280 / 312

页数：33

相关论文

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