RATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE FINITELY REPEATED PRISONERS-DILEMMA

被引：1155

作者：

KREPS, DM ^{[1
]}

MILGROM, P ^{[1
]}

ROBERTS, J ^{[1
]}

WILSON, R ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] NORTHWESTERN UNIV,GRAD SCH MANAGEMENT,EVANSTON,IL 60201

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 1982年 / 27卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0022-0531(82)90029-1

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

收藏

页码：245 / 252

页数：8

相关论文

共 5 条

[1] THE EMERGENCE OF COOPERATION AMONG EGOISTS
AXELROD, R
[J]. AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 1981, 75 (02) : 306 - 318
[2] KREPS D, ECONOMETRICA
[3] REPUTATION AND IMPERFECT INFORMATION
KREPS, DM
WILSON, R
[J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1982, 27 (02) : 253 - 279
[4] PREDATION, REPUTATION, AND ENTRY DETERRENCE
MILGROM, P
ROBERTS, J
[J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1982, 27 (02) : 280 - 312
[5] THE PRISONERS-DILEMMA AND DYNAMICAL-SYSTEMS ASSOCIATED TO NON-COOPERATIVE GAMES
SMALE, S
[J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1980, 48 (07) : 1617 - 1634