EXPERIMENTAL TESTS OF A SEQUENTIAL EQUILIBRIUM REPUTATION MODEL

被引:281
作者
CAMERER, C [1 ]
WEIGELT, K [1 ]
机构
[1] NYU, GRAD SCH BUSINESS ADM, DEPT MANAGEMENT, NEW YORK, NY 10006 USA
关键词
D O I
10.2307/1911840
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
引用
收藏
页码:1 / 36
页数:36
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