MONOPOLY AGENDA CONTROL AND ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION

被引:22
作者
BANKS, JS
机构
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
D O I
10.2307/2937795
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper extends the Romer-Rosenthal [1978, 1979] model of monopoly agenda control to an environment where only the agenda setter knows with certainty the outcome associated with a failed proposal. The presence of this asymmetric information implies that any “take-it-or-leave-it” proposal may provide information crucial to the decision calculus of the voters, a fact which an optimal proposal strategy will incorporate. The equilibrium behavior of the agenda setter and voters is characterized and contrasted with that in the complete information environment, and a number of empirical predictions concerning the nature of elections with monopoly controlled agendas are derived. © 1990 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
引用
收藏
页码:445 / 464
页数:20
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