THE ROLE OF EXPORT SUBSIDIES WHEN PRODUCT QUALITY IS UNKNOWN

被引:52
作者
BAGWELL, K [1 ]
STAIGER, RW [1 ]
机构
[1] STANFORD UNIV,STANFORD,CA 94305
关键词
D O I
10.1016/0022-1996(89)90078-0
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
引用
收藏
页码:69 / 89
页数:21
相关论文
共 32 条
[1]  
BAGWELL K, 1985, STUDIES IND EC DISCU, V129
[2]  
BAGWELL K, 1986, 705 NW MATH CTR DISC
[3]  
Bain JS, 1956, BARRIERS NEW COMPETI, DOI 10.4159/harvard.9780674188037
[4]   EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN SIGNALING GAMES [J].
BANKS, JS ;
SOBEL, J .
ECONOMETRICA, 1987, 55 (03) :647-661
[5]  
Brander J, 1986, STRATEGIC TRADE POLI, P23
[6]   EXPORT SUBSIDIES AND INTERNATIONAL MARKET SHARE RIVALRY [J].
BRANDER, JA ;
SPENCER, BJ .
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, 1985, 18 (1-2) :83-100
[7]   INTERNATIONAL-TRADE AND CAPITAL MOBILITY BETWEEN DIVERSIFIED ECONOMIES [J].
BRECHER, RA ;
FEENSTRA, RC .
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, 1983, 14 (3-4) :321-339
[8]   SIGNALING GAMES AND STABLE EQUILIBRIA [J].
CHO, IK ;
KREPS, DM .
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1987, 102 (02) :179-221
[9]  
DELATORRE J, 1972, PRODUCT LIFE CYCLE I, P227
[10]   IMPORT CONTROLS UNDER IMPERFECT INFORMATION [J].
DONNENFELD, S ;
WEBER, S ;
BENZION, U .
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, 1985, 19 (3-4) :341-354