EQUILIBRIA OF THE SEALED-BID MECHANISM FOR BARGAINING WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION

被引：83

作者：

LEININGER, W

LINHART, PB

RADNER, R

机构：

[1] AT&T BELL LABS,MURRAY HILL,NJ 07974

[2] NYU,NEW YORK,NY 10003

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0022-0531(89)90120-8

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：63 / 106

页数：44

共 14 条

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