MORE EFFICIENT RENT-SEEKING - A MUNCHHAUSEN SOLUTION

被引：110

作者：

LEININGER, W

机构：

[1] Fachbereich Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften, DW-Dortmund 50

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.1007/BF01053880

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

[No abstract available]

引用

页码：43 / 62

页数：20

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