THE EVOLUTION OF STOCHASTIC STRATEGIES IN THE PRISONERS-DILEMMA

被引：222

作者：

NOWAK, M

SIGMUND, K

机构：

[1] UNIV OXFORD, DEPT ZOOL, OXFORD OX1 3PS, ENGLAND

[2] UNIV VIENNA, INST MATH, A-1090 VIENNA, AUSTRIA

来源：

ACTA APPLICANDAE MATHEMATICAE | 1990年 / 20卷 / 03期

关键词：

PRISONERS DILEMMA; REACTIVE STRATEGIES; ITERATED GAMES; ADAPTIVE DYNAMICS;

D O I：

10.1007/BF00049570

中图分类号：

O29 [应用数学];

学科分类号：

070104 ;

摘要：

The evolution of reactive strategies for repeated 2 x 2-games occurring in biology is investigated by means of an adaptive dynamics.

引用

页码：247 / 265

页数：19

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