THE FURTHER EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION

[1] [Anonymous], 1957, GAMES DECIS

[2] [Anonymous], 1984, HEGEMONY

[3] [Anonymous], 1987, GENETIC ALGORITHMS S

[4] A QUANTITATIVE GENETIC MODEL OF RECIPROCAL ALTRUISM - A CONDITION FOR KIN OR GROUP SELECTION TO PREVAIL [J]. PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA-BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES, 1983, 80 (13): : 4065 - 4068

[5] AOKI K, 1985, POPULATION GENETICS, P429

[6] ACHIEVING COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY - STRATEGIES AND INSTITUTIONS [J]. WORLD POLITICS, 1985, 38 (01) : 226 - 254

[7] THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION [J]. SCIENCE, 1981, 211 (4489) : 1390 - 1396

[8] MORE EFFECTIVE CHOICE IN THE PRISONERS-DILEMMA [J]. JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, 1980, 24 (03) : 379 - 403

[9] THE EMERGENCE OF COOPERATION AMONG EGOISTS [J]. AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 1981, 75 (02) : 306 - 318

[10] AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH TO NORMS [J]. AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 1986, 80 (04) : 1095 - 1111

[1] [Anonymous], 1957, GAMES DECIS

[2] [Anonymous], 1984, HEGEMONY

[3] [Anonymous], 1987, GENETIC ALGORITHMS S

[4] A QUANTITATIVE GENETIC MODEL OF RECIPROCAL ALTRUISM - A CONDITION FOR KIN OR GROUP SELECTION TO PREVAIL [J]. PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA-BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES, 1983, 80 (13): : 4065 - 4068

[5] AOKI K, 1985, POPULATION GENETICS, P429

[6] ACHIEVING COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY - STRATEGIES AND INSTITUTIONS [J]. WORLD POLITICS, 1985, 38 (01) : 226 - 254

[7] THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION [J]. SCIENCE, 1981, 211 (4489) : 1390 - 1396

[8] MORE EFFECTIVE CHOICE IN THE PRISONERS-DILEMMA [J]. JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, 1980, 24 (03) : 379 - 403

[9] THE EMERGENCE OF COOPERATION AMONG EGOISTS [J]. AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 1981, 75 (02) : 306 - 318

[10] AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH TO NORMS [J]. AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 1986, 80 (04) : 1095 - 1111