THE FURTHER EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION

[41] KONDO T, 1986, INT RELAT STUD, V5, P3

[42] RATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE FINITELY REPEATED PRISONERS-DILEMMA [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1982, 27 (02) : 245 - 252

[43] COOPERATION AMONG EGOISTS IN PRISONERS-DILEMMA AND CHICKEN GAMES [J]. PUBLIC CHOICE, 1986, 51 (03) : 315 - 331

[44] MUTUAL RESTRAINT IN TREE SWALLOWS - A TEST OF THE TIT FOR TAT MODEL OF RECIPROCITY [J]. SCIENCE, 1985, 227 (4692) : 1363 - 1365

[45] MORE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION [J]. NATURE, 1987, 327 (6117) : 15 - 17

[46] McLean Iain, 1987, PUBLIC CHOICE

[47] MEGIDDO N, 1986, IBM RJ4984 COMP SCI

[48] TIT-FOR-TAT IN STICKLEBACKS AND THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION [J]. NATURE, 1987, 325 (6103) : 433 - 435

[49] THE OPTIMAL LEVEL OF GENEROSITY IN A SELFISH, UNCERTAIN ENVIRONMENT [J]. JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, 1985, 29 (04) : 611 - 618

[50] PRISONERS FINANCIAL DILEMMAS - A CONSOCIATIONAL FUTURE FOR LEBANON [J]. AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 1987, 81 (01) : 201 - 218

[41] KONDO T, 1986, INT RELAT STUD, V5, P3

[42] RATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE FINITELY REPEATED PRISONERS-DILEMMA [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1982, 27 (02) : 245 - 252

[43] COOPERATION AMONG EGOISTS IN PRISONERS-DILEMMA AND CHICKEN GAMES [J]. PUBLIC CHOICE, 1986, 51 (03) : 315 - 331

[44] MUTUAL RESTRAINT IN TREE SWALLOWS - A TEST OF THE TIT FOR TAT MODEL OF RECIPROCITY [J]. SCIENCE, 1985, 227 (4692) : 1363 - 1365

[45] MORE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION [J]. NATURE, 1987, 327 (6117) : 15 - 17

[46] McLean Iain, 1987, PUBLIC CHOICE

[47] MEGIDDO N, 1986, IBM RJ4984 COMP SCI

[48] TIT-FOR-TAT IN STICKLEBACKS AND THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION [J]. NATURE, 1987, 325 (6103) : 433 - 435

[49] THE OPTIMAL LEVEL OF GENEROSITY IN A SELFISH, UNCERTAIN ENVIRONMENT [J]. JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, 1985, 29 (04) : 611 - 618

[50] PRISONERS FINANCIAL DILEMMAS - A CONSOCIATIONAL FUTURE FOR LEBANON [J]. AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 1987, 81 (01) : 201 - 218