OPTIMAL COORDINATION MECHANISMS IN GENERALIZED PRINCIPAL AGENT PROBLEMS

被引：453

作者：

MYERSON, RB

机构：

来源：

JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS | 1982年 / 10卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0304-4068(82)90006-4

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

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页码：67 / 81

页数：15

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