OPTIMAL COORDINATION MECHANISMS IN GENERALIZED PRINCIPAL AGENT PROBLEMS

[11] Harsanyi J., 1967, MANAGE SCI, V14, P159, DOI [10.1287/mnsc.14.3.159, DOI 10.1287/MNSC.14.3.159]

[12] Harsanyi J. C., 1967, MANAGE SCI, V14, P159, DOI [10.1287/mnsc.14.3.159, DOI 10.1287/MNSC.14.3.159]

[13] MORAL HAZARD AND OBSERVABILITY [J]. BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1979, 10 (01): : 74 - 91

[14] HOLMSTROM B, 1980, UNPUB BAYESIAN MODEL

[15] HOLMSTROM B, 1977, THESIS STANFORD U ST

[16] OPTIMAL STRUCTURE OF INCENTIVES AND AUTHORITY WITHIN AN ORGANIZATION [J]. BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1976, 7 (01): : 105 - 131

[17] INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY AND THE BARGAINING PROBLEM [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1979, 47 (01) : 61 - 73

[18] OPTIMAL AUCTION DESIGN [J]. MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH, 1981, 6 (01) : 58 - 73

[19] ARBITRATION OF 2-PARTY DISPUTES UNDER UNCERTAINTY [J]. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1978, 45 (03) : 595 - 604

[20] ROSS SA, 1973, AM ECON REV, V63, P134

[11] Harsanyi J., 1967, MANAGE SCI, V14, P159, DOI [10.1287/mnsc.14.3.159, DOI 10.1287/MNSC.14.3.159]

[12] Harsanyi J. C., 1967, MANAGE SCI, V14, P159, DOI [10.1287/mnsc.14.3.159, DOI 10.1287/MNSC.14.3.159]

[13] MORAL HAZARD AND OBSERVABILITY [J]. BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1979, 10 (01): : 74 - 91

[14] HOLMSTROM B, 1980, UNPUB BAYESIAN MODEL

[15] HOLMSTROM B, 1977, THESIS STANFORD U ST

[16] OPTIMAL STRUCTURE OF INCENTIVES AND AUTHORITY WITHIN AN ORGANIZATION [J]. BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1976, 7 (01): : 105 - 131

[17] INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY AND THE BARGAINING PROBLEM [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1979, 47 (01) : 61 - 73

[18] OPTIMAL AUCTION DESIGN [J]. MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH, 1981, 6 (01) : 58 - 73

[19] ARBITRATION OF 2-PARTY DISPUTES UNDER UNCERTAINTY [J]. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1978, 45 (03) : 595 - 604

[20] ROSS SA, 1973, AM ECON REV, V63, P134