A MODEL OF DUOPOLY AND MEETING OR BEATING COMPETITION

[1] ANDERSON RM, 1985, QUICK RESPONSE EQUIL

[2] BELTON T, 1986, RES PAPERS BANKING F, V87

[3] MOST-FAVORED-CUSTOMER PRICING AND TACIT COLLUSION [J]. RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1986, 17 (03) : 377 - 388

[4] Friedman J., 1977, OLIGOPOLY THEORY GAM

[5] RESOURCE-ALLOCATION UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1981, 49 (01) : 33 - 64

[6] KALAI E, 1986, 677 NW U CTR MATH ST

[7] OSBORNE DK, 1976, AM ECON REV, V66, P835

[8] SALOP SC, 1982, IEA S OTTAWA

[9] LIMITED-LIABILITY CONTRACTS BETWEEN PRINCIPAL AND AGENT [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1983, 29 (01) : 1 - 21

[10] Scherer, 1970, IND MARKET STRUCTURE

[1] ANDERSON RM, 1985, QUICK RESPONSE EQUIL

[2] BELTON T, 1986, RES PAPERS BANKING F, V87

[3] MOST-FAVORED-CUSTOMER PRICING AND TACIT COLLUSION [J]. RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1986, 17 (03) : 377 - 388

[4] Friedman J., 1977, OLIGOPOLY THEORY GAM

[5] RESOURCE-ALLOCATION UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1981, 49 (01) : 33 - 64

[6] KALAI E, 1986, 677 NW U CTR MATH ST

[7] OSBORNE DK, 1976, AM ECON REV, V66, P835

[8] SALOP SC, 1982, IEA S OTTAWA

[9] LIMITED-LIABILITY CONTRACTS BETWEEN PRINCIPAL AND AGENT [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1983, 29 (01) : 1 - 21

[10] Scherer, 1970, IND MARKET STRUCTURE