A NOTE ON BALANCEDNESS AND NONEMPTINESS OF THE CORE IN VOTING GAMES

被引：4

作者：

LEBRETON, M

机构：

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.1007/BF01248498

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：111 / 117

页数：7

共 9 条

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