The effect of Enron, Andersen, and Sarbanes-Oxley on the US market for audit services

被引:27
作者
Asthana, Sharad [1 ]
Balsam, Steven [2 ]
Kim, Sungsoo [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Texas San Antonio, Dept Accounting, COB, San Antonio, TX 78249 USA
[2] Temple Univ, Dept Accounting, Fox Sch Business & Management, Philadelphia, PA 19122 USA
[3] Rutgers State Univ, Dept Accounting, Sch Business, Camden, NJ USA
关键词
United States of America; Auditor's fees; Legislation; Auditing standards;
D O I
10.1108/10309610910975306
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of the Enron scandal, Arthur Andersen's demise and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on audit fees. Design/methodology/approach - The paper uses empirical methodology (univariate and multivariate). Findings - Audit fees and the Big-4 premium increased in 2002. Increase was larger for bigger and riskier clients. Evidence is also consistent with a competitive market for former Andersen clients. Research limitations/implications - Data requirements might bias the sample towards larger sized firms. Data availability limits the number of observations. Practical implications - The research findings on audit fees in post-Enron and Arthur Andersen period reported in this paper are important for policy makers. Originality/value - It is found that the premium charged by Big 4 over non-Big 4 has increased in 2002, and that the ability of an auditor to charge a premium is adversely affected when its reputation is tarnished. It is also reported that the frequency of voluntary switches within the Big 4 is lowest in 19 years. The audit fee model was also refined by adding two ownership variables to control for agency aspect of client firms; inside and institutional ownership.
引用
收藏
页码:4 / +
页数:25
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