THE POLITICS OF 1992 - FISCAL-POLICY AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

被引:145
作者
PERSSON, T [1 ]
TABELLINI, G [1 ]
机构
[1] UNIV BRESCIA,BRESCIA,ITALY
关键词
D O I
10.2307/2297993
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The internal market in Europe will greatly increase the international mobility of resources. How will this affect fiscal policy in different countries? We consider taxation of capital in a two-country model, where a democratically-chosen government in each country chooses tax policy. Higher capital mobility changes the politico-economic equilibrium in two ways. On the one hand, it leads to more tax competition between the countries: this "economic effect" tends to lower tax rates in both countries. On the other hand, it alters voters' preferences and makes them elect a different government: this "political effect" offsets the increased tax competition, although not completely.
引用
收藏
页码:689 / 701
页数:13
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