BARGAINING POWER, FEAR OF DISAGREEMENT, AND WAGE SETTLEMENTS - THEORY AND EVIDENCE FROM UNITED-STATES INDUSTRY

被引：140

作者：

SVEJNAR, J

机构：

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/1912322

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：1055 / 1078

页数：24

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