ON COOPERATION, TIT-FOR-TAT AND MIRRORS

[1] THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION [J]. SCIENCE, 1981, 211 (4489) : 1390 - 1396

[2] NO PURE STRATEGY IS EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE IN THE REPEATED PRISONERS-DILEMMA GAME [J]. NATURE, 1987, 327 (6117) : 58 - 59

[3] DO GUPPIES PLAY TIT FOR TAT DURING PREDATOR INSPECTION VISITS [J]. BEHAVIORAL ECOLOGY AND SOCIOBIOLOGY, 1988, 23 (06) : 395 - 399

[4] TIT-FOR-TAT COOPERATION IN STICKLEBACKS - A CRITIQUE OF MILINSKI [J]. ANIMAL BEHAVIOUR, 1990, 39 : 987 - 988

[5] MASTERS WM, 1990, ANIM BEHAV, V39, P603

[6] MORE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION [J]. NATURE, 1987, 327 (6117) : 15 - 17

[7] NO ALTERNATIVE TO TIT-FOR-TAT COOPERATION IN STICKLEBACKS [J]. ANIMAL BEHAVIOUR, 1990, 39 : 989 - 991

[8] TIT-FOR-TAT IN STICKLEBACKS AND THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION [J]. NATURE, 1987, 325 (6103) : 433 - 435

[9] Pitcher T.J., 1986, P294

[1] THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION [J]. SCIENCE, 1981, 211 (4489) : 1390 - 1396

[2] NO PURE STRATEGY IS EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE IN THE REPEATED PRISONERS-DILEMMA GAME [J]. NATURE, 1987, 327 (6117) : 58 - 59

[3] DO GUPPIES PLAY TIT FOR TAT DURING PREDATOR INSPECTION VISITS [J]. BEHAVIORAL ECOLOGY AND SOCIOBIOLOGY, 1988, 23 (06) : 395 - 399

[4] TIT-FOR-TAT COOPERATION IN STICKLEBACKS - A CRITIQUE OF MILINSKI [J]. ANIMAL BEHAVIOUR, 1990, 39 : 987 - 988

[5] MASTERS WM, 1990, ANIM BEHAV, V39, P603

[6] MORE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION [J]. NATURE, 1987, 327 (6117) : 15 - 17

[7] NO ALTERNATIVE TO TIT-FOR-TAT COOPERATION IN STICKLEBACKS [J]. ANIMAL BEHAVIOUR, 1990, 39 : 989 - 991

[8] TIT-FOR-TAT IN STICKLEBACKS AND THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION [J]. NATURE, 1987, 325 (6103) : 433 - 435

[9] Pitcher T.J., 1986, P294