WARRANTIES AS SIGNALS UNDER CONSUMER MORAL HAZARD

被引：123

作者：

LUTZ, NA

机构：

来源：

RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | 1989年 / 20卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2555691

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：239 / 255

页数：17

共 15 条

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