REPUTATION AND CORPORATE-STRATEGY - A REVIEW OF RECENT THEORY AND APPLICATIONS

[11] DAUGHETY AF, IN PRESS J LAW EC OR

[12] DeAngelo L.E., 1981, J ACCOUNT ECON, V3, P183, DOI [10.1016/0165-4101(81)90002-1, DOI 10.1016/0165-4101(81)90002-1]

[13] RIPOFFS, LEMONS, AND REPUTATION FORMATION IN AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS - A LABORATORY MARKET STUDY [J]. JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 1985, 40 (03) : 809 - 820

[14] DRANOVE DA, 1983, THESIS STANFORD U

[15] PREYING FOR TIME [J]. JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, 1985, 33 (04) : 445 - 460

[16] CORPORATE DIRECTOR LIABILITY AND MONITORING PREFERENCES [J]. JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING AND PUBLIC POLICY, 1985, 4 (01) : 13 - 31

[17] FRIEDMAN J, 1986, GAME THEORY APPLICAT

[18] GROSSMAN R, 1980, BUSINESS WEEK 0128, P23

[19] PERFECT SEQUENTIAL EQUILIBRIUM [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1986, 39 (01) : 97 - 119

[20] THE INFORMATIONAL ROLE OF WARRANTIES AND PRIVATE DISCLOSURE ABOUT PRODUCT QUALITY [J]. JOURNAL OF LAW & ECONOMICS, 1981, 24 (03) : 461 - 483

[11] DAUGHETY AF, IN PRESS J LAW EC OR

[12] DeAngelo L.E., 1981, J ACCOUNT ECON, V3, P183, DOI [10.1016/0165-4101(81)90002-1, DOI 10.1016/0165-4101(81)90002-1]

[13] RIPOFFS, LEMONS, AND REPUTATION FORMATION IN AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS - A LABORATORY MARKET STUDY [J]. JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 1985, 40 (03) : 809 - 820

[14] DRANOVE DA, 1983, THESIS STANFORD U

[15] PREYING FOR TIME [J]. JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, 1985, 33 (04) : 445 - 460

[16] CORPORATE DIRECTOR LIABILITY AND MONITORING PREFERENCES [J]. JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING AND PUBLIC POLICY, 1985, 4 (01) : 13 - 31

[17] FRIEDMAN J, 1986, GAME THEORY APPLICAT

[18] GROSSMAN R, 1980, BUSINESS WEEK 0128, P23

[19] PERFECT SEQUENTIAL EQUILIBRIUM [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1986, 39 (01) : 97 - 119

[20] THE INFORMATIONAL ROLE OF WARRANTIES AND PRIVATE DISCLOSURE ABOUT PRODUCT QUALITY [J]. JOURNAL OF LAW & ECONOMICS, 1981, 24 (03) : 461 - 483