A MEDIAN VOTER MODEL OF SOCIAL-SECURITY

被引:37
作者
BOADWAY, RW [1 ]
WILDASIN, DE [1 ]
机构
[1] INDIANA UNIV,BLOOMINGTON,IN 47401
关键词
D O I
10.2307/2526649
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
引用
收藏
页码:307 / 328
页数:22
相关论文
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