INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP, CAPITAL STRUCTURE, AND FIRM PERFORMANCE

被引:182
作者
CHAGANTI, R [1 ]
DAMANPOUR, F [1 ]
机构
[1] RUTGERS STATE UNIV, GRAD SCH MANAGEMENT, NEWARK, NJ 07102 USA
关键词
INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP; EXECUTIVE STOCKHOLDING; INSIDER-INSTITUTIONAL STOCKHOLDING; FAMILY STOCKHOLDING; CAPITAL STRUCTURE; FIRM PERFORMANCE;
D O I
10.1002/smj.4250120702
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
In most studies of ownership and firm performance, researchers have assumed different forms of ownership do not interact in their effect on firm strategy or performance. Focusing on the role of institutional owners, this study poses two related questions: (1) What are the relationships between outside institutional shareholdings, on the one hand, and a firm's capital structure and performance, on the other? and; (2) Does the size of stockholdings by corporate executives, family owners, and insider‐institutions modify those relationships? The data, collected from 40 pairs of manufacturing firms selected from as many industries over a 3‐year period, shows that the size of outside institutional stockholdings has a significant effect on the firm's capital structure. We have also found that family and inside institutional owners' shareholdings moderate the relationship between outside institutional shareholdings and capital structure. Likewise, corporate executives' shareholdings supplement the relationship between outside institutional shareholdings and firms' performance. These findings suggest that internal and external coalitions interact with each other to influence the firm's conduct. Copyright © 1991 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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页码:479 / 491
页数:13
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