AGGREGATION AND LINEARITY IN THE PROVISION OF INTERTEMPORAL INCENTIVES

被引：1420

作者：

HOLMSTROM, B

MILGROM, P

机构：

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/1913238

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：303 / 328

页数：26

共 18 条

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