RENEGOTIATION AND INFORMATION REVELATION OVER TIME - THE CASE OF OPTIMAL LABOR CONTRACTS

被引：102

作者：

DEWATRIPONT, M

机构：

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2937812

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：589 / 619

页数：31

共 31 条

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