COMMITMENT THROUGH RENEGOTIATION-PROOF CONTRACTS WITH 3RD-PARTIES

[1] AGHION P, 1987, AM ECON REV, V77, P388

[2] CRAMTON P, 1984, IMSSS444 TECHN REP

[3] EFFICIENT AND DURABLE DECISION RULES - A REFORMULATION [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1985, 53 (04) : 817 - 835

[4] ENTRY DETERRENCE UNDER TRADE-UNIONS [J]. EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 1987, 31 (1-2) : 149 - 156

[5] DEWATRIPONT M, 1986, THESIS HARVARD U

[6] ROLE OF INVESTMENT IN ENTRY-DETERRENCE [J]. ECONOMIC JOURNAL, 1980, 90 (357) : 95 - 106

[7] THE FOLK THEOREM IN REPEATED GAMES WITH DISCOUNTING OR WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1986, 54 (03) : 533 - 554

[8] FUDENBERG D, 1986, DYNAMIC MODELS OLIGO

[9] EXIT [J]. RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1985, 16 (02) : 184 - 194

[10] GREEN J, 1987, IN PRESS ECONOMETRIC

[1] AGHION P, 1987, AM ECON REV, V77, P388

[2] CRAMTON P, 1984, IMSSS444 TECHN REP

[3] EFFICIENT AND DURABLE DECISION RULES - A REFORMULATION [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1985, 53 (04) : 817 - 835

[4] ENTRY DETERRENCE UNDER TRADE-UNIONS [J]. EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 1987, 31 (1-2) : 149 - 156

[5] DEWATRIPONT M, 1986, THESIS HARVARD U

[6] ROLE OF INVESTMENT IN ENTRY-DETERRENCE [J]. ECONOMIC JOURNAL, 1980, 90 (357) : 95 - 106

[7] THE FOLK THEOREM IN REPEATED GAMES WITH DISCOUNTING OR WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1986, 54 (03) : 533 - 554

[8] FUDENBERG D, 1986, DYNAMIC MODELS OLIGO

[9] EXIT [J]. RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1985, 16 (02) : 184 - 194

[10] GREEN J, 1987, IN PRESS ECONOMETRIC