EVENT CONTROLLABILITY IN COUNTERFACTUAL THINKING

被引:143
作者
GIROTTO, V [1 ]
LEGRENZI, P [1 ]
RIZZO, A [1 ]
机构
[1] UNIV TRIESTE,I-34100 TRIESTE,ITALY
关键词
D O I
10.1016/0001-6918(91)90007-M
中图分类号
B84 [心理学];
学科分类号
04 ; 0402 ;
摘要
The counterfactual assessment of events, i.e. is the mental construction of alternatives to factual events, is a pervasive mental process that is quite natural for people. For example, people easily make counterfactual statements when reflecting on dramatic events ('If only I hadn't drunk alcohol the night of the car accident...'). The way in which people select the events to mutate when requested to undo a scenario outcome seems to be governed by general rules. One is that subjects tend to select exceptional (i.e. unusual or surprising) rather than normal events (Kahneman and Tversky 1982a,b; Kahneman and Miller 1986). Another is that subjects prefer to select the first rather than the subsequent events in a causal chain (Wells, Taylor and Turtle 1987). We hypothesized that events corresponding to controllable actions (i.e. voluntary decisions) by the protagonist of a scenario are more mentally mutable than events which occur in the surrounding background. In experiment 1, we manipulated the order and the controllability of four events in a scenario. Contrary to the causal order effect hypothesis, subjects preferred to change the event corresponding to a voluntary decision of the scenario actor, regardless of its relative position in the scenario. Experiment 2 showed that subjects made this choice regardless of the normal vs. exceptional status of the voluntary action event. Experiment 3 gave evidence that an unconstrained action performed by the focal actor of a story is more mutable than a constrained action performed by the same actor. The implications of these findings for the analysis of accidents involving human errors are discussed.
引用
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页码:111 / 133
页数:23
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