STRATEGIC BARGAINING MODELS AND INTERPRETATION OF STRIKE DATA

被引：90

作者：

KENNAN, J ^{[1
]}

WILSON, R ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] STANFORD UNIV,SCH BUSINESS,STANFORD,CA 94305

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.1002/jae.3950040506

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：S87 / S130

页数：44

共 74 条

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