REPUTATION IN REPEATED 2ND-PRICE AUCTIONS

被引：60

作者：

BIKHCHANDANI, S

机构：

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0022-0531(88)90151-2

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：97 / 119

页数：23

共 13 条

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