Monetary and fiscal policy interaction and government debt stabilization

被引:26
作者
vanAarle, B [1 ]
Bovenberg, L [1 ]
Raith, M [1 ]
机构
[1] UNIV BIELEFELD,DEPT ECON,D-33501 BIELEFELD,GERMANY
来源
JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS-ZEITSCHRIFT FUR NATIONALOKONOMIE | 1995年 / 62卷 / 02期
关键词
D O I
10.1007/BF01226006
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Employing differential games, this paper models the strategic interaction between monetary authorities who control monetization and fiscal authorities who control primary fiscal deficits. We analytically compute and interpret the cooperative and noncooperative Nash open-loop equilibria. Furthermore, we reinterpret unpleasant monetarist arithmetic and analyze the impact of a more conservative central bank. Finally, to explore the consequences of a more independent central bank, we analyze Stackelberg open-loop equilibria.
引用
收藏
页码:111 / 140
页数:30
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