ON THE TOURNAMENT EQUILIBRIUM SET

被引：14

作者：

DUTTA, B

机构：

[1] Planning Unit, Indian Statistical Institute, New Dehli, 110016

来源：

SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE | 1990年 / 7卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1007/BF01376285

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

An example is provided showing that Schwartz's tournament equilibrium set is not identical to the minimal covering set of Dutta. © 1990 Springer-Verlag.

引用

收藏

页码：381 / 383

页数：3

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