NONMANIPULABLE CORES

[1] Champsaur P., 1975, International Journal of Game Theory, V4, P113, DOI 10.1007/BF01780629

[2] THE STRATEGY STRUCTURE OF 2-SIDED MATCHING MARKETS [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1985, 53 (04) : 873 - 888

[3] COLLEGE ADMISSIONS AND STABILITY OF MARRIAGE [J]. AMERICAN MATHEMATICAL MONTHLY, 1962, 69 (01) : 9 - &

[4] CHARACTERIZATION OF SATISFACTORY MECHANISMS FOR REVELATION OF PREFERENCES FOR PUBLIC-GOODS [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1977, 45 (02) : 427 - 438

[5] CORES OF EFFECTIVITY FUNCTIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION THEORY [J]. JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS, 1982, 10 (01) : 115 - 145

[6] MOULIN H, 1986, CORE SELECTION PRICI

[7] NAKAMURA K, 1973, INT J GAME THEORY, V4, P95

[8] PELEG B, 1983, GAME THEORETIC ANAL

[9] PELEG B, 1984, PROOF CORE ORDINAL C

[10] ROTH A, 1984, UNPUB INCENTIVES COL

[1] Champsaur P., 1975, International Journal of Game Theory, V4, P113, DOI 10.1007/BF01780629

[2] THE STRATEGY STRUCTURE OF 2-SIDED MATCHING MARKETS [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1985, 53 (04) : 873 - 888

[3] COLLEGE ADMISSIONS AND STABILITY OF MARRIAGE [J]. AMERICAN MATHEMATICAL MONTHLY, 1962, 69 (01) : 9 - &

[4] CHARACTERIZATION OF SATISFACTORY MECHANISMS FOR REVELATION OF PREFERENCES FOR PUBLIC-GOODS [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1977, 45 (02) : 427 - 438

[5] CORES OF EFFECTIVITY FUNCTIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION THEORY [J]. JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS, 1982, 10 (01) : 115 - 145

[6] MOULIN H, 1986, CORE SELECTION PRICI

[7] NAKAMURA K, 1973, INT J GAME THEORY, V4, P95

[8] PELEG B, 1983, GAME THEORETIC ANAL

[9] PELEG B, 1984, PROOF CORE ORDINAL C

[10] ROTH A, 1984, UNPUB INCENTIVES COL