CEO Cash and Stock-Based Compensation Changes, Layoff Decisions, and Shareholder Value

被引：24

作者：

Brookman, Jeffrey ^{[1
]}

Chang, Saeyoung ^{[1
]}

Rennie, Craig ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Nevada, Las Vegas, NV 89154 USA

[2] Univ Arkansas, Sam M Walton Coll Business, Dept Finance, WCOB 302 1, Fayetteville, AR 72701 USA

来源：

FINANCIAL REVIEW | 2007年 / 42卷 / 01期

关键词：

CEO pay; corporate governance; corporate restructuring; executive compensation; layoffs;

D O I：

10.1111/j.1540-6288.2007.00163.x

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

The chief executive officers (CEOs) of firms announcing layoffs receive 22.8% more total pay in the subsequent year than other CEOs. The pay increases result almost entirely from increases in stock-based compensation and are found to persist. In addition, layoff announcements are accompanied by shareholder value increases averaging $40 million to $95 million. One-time labor cost savings from layoffs average $65 million. We conclude that CEOs receive pay increases following layoffs as rewards for past decisions and to motivate value-enhancing decisions in the future.

引用

页码：99 / 119

页数：21

共 34 条

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