AMBIGUITY IN SPATIAL MODELS OF POLICY FORMATION

[1] Anderson T.W., 1955, P AM MATH SOC, V6, P170, DOI [10.2307/2032333, DOI 10.2307/2032333]

[2] EXPOSITORY DEVELOPMENT OF A MATHEMATICAL MODEL OF ELECTORAL PROCESS [J]. AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 1970, 64 (02) : 426 - 448

[3] Feller W., 1957, INTRO PROBABILITY TH

[4] Fishburn PC., 1973, THEORY SOCIAL CHOICE

[5] HOGG RV, 1970, INTRO MATH STATISTIC

[6] MCKELVEY R, 1974, PUBLIC CHOICE, V18

[7] McKelvey R. D., 1976, Mathematics of Operations Research, V1, P144, DOI 10.1287/moor.1.2.144

[8] POLICY RELATED VOTING AND ELECTORAL EQUILIBRIUM [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1975, 43 (5-6) : 815 - 843

[9] MUDHOLKAR GS, 1966, P AM MATH SOC, V17

[10] NOTE ON ZECKHAUSERS MAJORITY RULE WITH LOTTERIES ON ALTERNATIVES - CASE OF PARADOX OF VOTING [J]. QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1970, 84 (04) : 705 - 709

[1] Anderson T.W., 1955, P AM MATH SOC, V6, P170, DOI [10.2307/2032333, DOI 10.2307/2032333]

[2] EXPOSITORY DEVELOPMENT OF A MATHEMATICAL MODEL OF ELECTORAL PROCESS [J]. AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 1970, 64 (02) : 426 - 448

[3] Feller W., 1957, INTRO PROBABILITY TH

[4] Fishburn PC., 1973, THEORY SOCIAL CHOICE

[5] HOGG RV, 1970, INTRO MATH STATISTIC

[6] MCKELVEY R, 1974, PUBLIC CHOICE, V18

[7] McKelvey R. D., 1976, Mathematics of Operations Research, V1, P144, DOI 10.1287/moor.1.2.144

[8] POLICY RELATED VOTING AND ELECTORAL EQUILIBRIUM [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1975, 43 (5-6) : 815 - 843

[9] MUDHOLKAR GS, 1966, P AM MATH SOC, V17

[10] NOTE ON ZECKHAUSERS MAJORITY RULE WITH LOTTERIES ON ALTERNATIVES - CASE OF PARADOX OF VOTING [J]. QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1970, 84 (04) : 705 - 709