ON THE ORDER OF ELIMINATING DOMINATED STRATEGIES

被引：29

作者：

GILBOA, I

KALAI, E

ZEMEL, E

机构：

[1] J.L. Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University, Evanston

来源：

OPERATIONS RESEARCH LETTERS | 1990年 / 9卷 / 02期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

game theory; strategy domination;

D O I：

10.1016/0167-6377(90)90046-8

中图分类号：

C93 [管理学]; O22 [运筹学];

学科分类号：

070105 ; 12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;

摘要：

It is known that different orders of eliminating dominated strategies in n-person games may yield different reduced games. We give conditions which guarantee that the reduced game is unique. For finite games, the conditions include the well-known cases of strict dominance, and in a slightly weaker form, of regular dominance for zero sum and similar games. © 1990.

引用

页码：85 / 89

页数：5

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