UNINFORMED CUSTOMERS AND NONPROFIT ORGANIZATION - MODELING CONTRACT FAILURE THEORY

被引：15

作者：

CHILLEMI, O ^{[1
]}

GUI, B ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV TRIESTE,I-34127 TRIESTE,ITALY

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 1991年 / 35卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0165-1765(91)90095-3

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

When product quality is unobservable before purchase, the equilibrium price may be inefficiently high in order to signal high quality. We present a reputation model where under reasonable assumption nonprofit organizations can credibly charge lower prices than for-profit organizations. © 1991.

引用

页码：5 / 8

页数：4

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